

Floating Bridge Review Report Final for Scrutiny Committee January 9th 2018

1. Executive Summary

1.1 This report presents the findings of a review team set up to examine the circumstances surrounding the purchase, design, construction, provision and subsequent service failure of Floating Bridge 6, which all came to a head in May 2017, when the vessel arrived to be introduced into service.

1.2 The review has sought to establish what actually happened based on the facts and to answer the key question:

“Why did we end up where we are?”

1.3 In examining and reviewing the information and documentation gathered during the course of the review I am of the view that the council did all that was reasonably possible to secure a suitably competent and experienced team of experts and contractors to design and build the Floating Bridge 6. It was not however, able to confirm that the new vessel would deliver the outcomes expected by the council until such time as it was reintroduced to its chains in May 2017. It remains impossible to assess whether Floating Bridge 6 will achieve all of the required outcomes provided to the Naval Architects that designed the vessel, until such time as the council has resolved the two principal issues in relation to the clearance over the chains at an ebb tide and the noise of the vessel.

1.4 In my opinion, therefore, the outcome of the legal advice in relation to the design contract is fundamental, to understanding the reasons why Floating Bridge 6 did not perform as expected. As a result of this legal advice these issues are consequently not addressed in further detail in this report for legal reasons.

1.5 There are a number of other supplementary ~~issues~~ matters which are revealed in the report including: issues relating to project governance, staff training, communication strategy and the involvement of third parties.

1.6 Notwithstanding this position, the report itself presents a number of findings in an open and transparent way - so that the local community, local interest groups and the wider Island are all able to understand how a new vessel, costing over £3.7 million pounds of public money to build, has failed to provide the service expected.

1.7 The report needs to be considered as a whole, not in parts, so as to appreciate the complexity of what happened and in what circumstances. Therefore I have not previously responded in any detail to questions which would have diluted the overall position.

1.8 A significant feature for me has been the lack of political engagement with the process of procuring and reintroducing Floating Bridge 6. This is something which I have tried to correct as the leader of council since becoming directly involved with the resolving the issues around Floating Bridge 6 since May 2017. This has led to the production of this report in an effort to pick up the pieces' of decisions not taken, learn the lessons from the past and inform the council's administration in delivering its leadership responsibilities now and in the future.

1.9 I also recognise the significant impact of the reductions and changes in the senior management capacity over recent years and particularly over the lifetime of this project and the potential impact this had on the management of the project. This will be

something for the Chief Executive to take into account when considering what managerial action needs to be taken in response to this report.

1.10 My report will be formally presented to scrutiny on the 9th January.

2 Introduction

2.1 In undertaking this review the team focused on what actions and decisions were taken by the council throughout the project to deliver Floating Bridge 6, rather than looking at what steps were needed to restore the vessel to service which is a matter for the Head of Place.

2.2 The issues that have plagued Floating Bridge 6 since its launch in May are well known, the main issues being the level of clearance above the chains which limits its ability to operate during certain tidal states and noise issues. Given the difficulties these issues have caused within the local communities at both East and West Cowes an internal review team was formed to establish the facts and to understand the chain of events that led to the vessel being taken out of service. The aim of the review is to ensure that any lessons learnt are factored into future strategic projects.

2.3 It must be noted at the outset that there remain issues with the level of clearance above the chains and noise issues and the council has engaged independent expert advisers to explore potential resolutions to these issues. The council's legal team is dealing with these expert advisers. This report does not seek to establish the cause of these issues or attribute blame to any party, but reviews the council's overall management of the project within the context of the Solent Gateways scheme.

2.4 Based on previous experience in naval vessel construction it is however to be expected that with the launch of any new vessel there will be some teething problems and operational issues to overcome. But the challenges faced in this case have exceeded those expectations.

3 Methodology

3.1 The review team was led by the Leader of the Council Dave Stewart and included, John Kilpatrick (Member for Fishbourne and Binstead), Sharon Betts (Strategic Manager Business Centre) and Ian Lloyd (Organisational Intelligence and Corporate Performance Manager) who worked together to interview members of staff working on the project and stakeholders as well as reviewing the project documentation. The approach taken by the review team was to:

Stage 1 - form a review team and meet to agree the purpose and process by which the team will complete the review required (September 2017)

Stage 2 – initiate meetings and interviews with key individuals and gather relevant information and documentation as per agreed purpose (October to December 2017)

Stage 3 – review the information and documentation gathered, discuss findings and prepare a report for the cabinet member and scrutiny committee (December 2017)

Stage 4 – submit the report to scrutiny (January 2018) and then to cabinet

- 3.1 The team have interviewed the individuals listed at Appendix 1 and reviewed the documents listed at Appendix 2. The documents reviewed span the period 2013, when the Highways Private Finance Initiative contract was awarded and management of the Floating Bridge transferred from IWC Highways to IWC Commercial Services and the Solent Gateways partnership bid for Solent Local Enterprise Partnership Funding for a new Floating Bridge, to December 2017 when floating bridge 6 re-entered service, albeit operating at reduced hours.

Floating Bridge 6



4 Background

- 4.1 In 2013 when the Highways Private Finance Initiative (PFI) contract was being negotiated it was agreed that the replacement of the floating bridge could not be included within the PFI contract. Consequently the then Director for Economy and Environment restructured the management of the floating bridge and moved it to the Isle of Wight Council's commercial services team. The operational responsibilities of the service were matched to those of the parking operations manager and therefore he managed the day to day activities of the floating bridge service whilst the strategic functions of the service sat with the commercial services manager.
- 4.2 It was recognised that there may well have been problems in the past with the chain depths but there were no recent records to prove this one way or another. It has, however, been reported that the staff of floating bridge 5 regularly adjusted the tensions of the chains to suit the prevailing conditions in the river, without any formal assessment of the clearance over the chains as a result of these changes.
- 4.3 As Floating Bridge 5 was 40 years of age and maintenance costs to keep it operational and satisfy the Maritime & Coastguard Agency annual inspections were increasing, the vessel was approaching the end of its useful life. It became clear from survey reports

that the vessel needed to be replaced, in order to maintain an important link, vital to the economic well-being of both Cowes and East Cowes. The then Leader of the Council and then Director for Economy & Environment entered into discussions with the Solent Local Enterprise Partnership (SLEP) to seek funding for a replacement.

The Solent Gateways Funding and Link to Funding from the Solent Local Enterprise Partnership

- 4.4 The replacement of the floating bridge was only one element of a wider, large scale, Solent Gateways (as it became known) project, initiated by Southampton City Council and Royal Pier Waterfront (RPW) Ltd in association with Red Funnel Ferries. The aim of the project being to secure the relocation of Red Funnel in Southampton, to free up the area around Mayflower Park for regeneration through private sector investment. The project has the support of the Homes and Communities Agency (HCA) and involves the development of its land in East Cowes following its transfer to Red Funnel.
- 4.5 The Council was able to negotiate becoming part of this project at a late stage, in order to secure physical improvements in East Cowes and funding towards the cost of replacing the floating bridge, which was starting to cost the council an increasing amount of money to maintain.
- 4.6 The Solent Gateways project is however a very complex project involving many different partners from both the public and private sectors, with competing needs. This is best demonstrated by the fact that the project has been advised by two separate project management companies (Parose Projects & BPP Regeneration) since its initial inception. This was to help shape the project overall and undertake works necessary to secure project funding from the Solent Local Enterprise Partnership (SLEP). Initial advice was provided under a joint commission between Southampton City Council and the Isle of Wight Council, further advice and support was then sourced and funded directly by RPW in order to progress the project at the pace it required.
- 4.7 As a result of the work of the partners the SLEP now sees the Solent Gateways project as three interrelated schemes, within which the floating bridge stood alone. The other two elements being the works to relocate Red Funnel in Southampton aligned to improvements in its terminal facilities in East Cowes and the wider town centre. As a consequence, the council was able to progress the replacement of the floating bridge, independently of its partners. The council is however, a key player in the wider partnership and the expectation is that it will continue to work within its partners to secure the private and public sector investment necessary to deliver the aspirations of the overall scheme.
- 4.8 The complexity of the scheme and the challenges it presented to the council, is further evidenced by the fact that the council chose to commence elements of the procurement process for the floating bridge, at its risk, before the SLEP had confirmed its commitment to funding the project. It was understood this was considered essential in order to be able to draw down the funds from the SLEP which were proposed for the 2016/17 financial year.
- 4.9 During the summer of 2015, the council was required by the SLEP to undertake further work to update its original business case for the floating bridge, resolving gaps and omissions that were identified during the SLEP's due diligence activities but most significantly, demonstrate that any funding provided by the SLEP would not be in breach of European Guidelines in respect of State Aid Provision. This last piece of work was led by the council in association with the final project management company whilst the first appointed company led on updating the financial business case for the

SLEP. Although the council agreed to enter into a funding agreement with the SLEP in October 2015, this was not formally completed until March 2016.

4.10 Work with all of the partners in the Solent Gateways project involved a considerable amount of senior management capacity, at a moment in time when it was severely limited. The position of Director of Economy and Environment had not been replaced following the post holder's departure and the Managing Director's post had been reduced to four days a week. The council was, however, committed to giving strategic support to its Solent Gateway partners in securing the delivery of the project as a whole, this support was provided by the then, Deputy Managing Director.

4.11 The levels of staff reduction referred to above also had a significant impact on the council's capability and capacity to manage projects such as the new floating bridge.

5 Solent Local Enterprise Partnership Funding

5.1 The provision of a new floating bridge was included in the Solent Local Enterprise Partnership (SLEP) funding bid for £15m towards the Solent Gateways project for the regeneration of Southampton and East Cowes and which was approved by Government as part of a £124.8m contribution to the delivery of the Solent Strategic Economic Plan. Delivery of a new floating bridge was anticipated by the SLEP and IWC to be the next stage of delivering the regeneration project in East Cowes continuing to provide a safe and reliable river crossing for future generations of foot passengers and vehicles.

5.2 However during the process of negotiating the final details of this wider project it was anticipated that the delivery of the new floating bridge may be delayed if it remained dependent on delivery of Solent Gateways Project as a whole. Hence it was negotiated with the SLEP and the project partners that the replacement of the floating bridge would be treated as a standalone project attracting grant funding of £3,776,782. The council went at risk on the procurement process whilst it was still negotiating with the SLEP. Funding agreement was not finally signed until March 2016, with an anticipated completion date of July 2016.

6 Roles and Responsibilities

6.1 There were several key roles involved in the project, these being:

- Naval Architect consultant
- Ship Builder
- Owners Representative
- Project Manager (IWC staff)
- Head of Service / Strategic Manager (IWC staff)
- Service Director (IWC staff)
- Project Sponsor (IWC staff)

An understanding of each of the project roles is necessary to consider the following sections of this report, therefore a summary of these roles is provided, as follows.

6.1.1 Naval Architect consultant: The council entered into a consultancy agreement with Burness Corlett Three Quays (BCTQ) on 26 August 2015, which requires BCTQ "to assist the council in the preparation of the outline design and statement of requirements for the design and construction of the new floating bridge, to provide assistance with evaluation of the tenders [from shipyards for the design and build of

the Floating Bridge] and overseeing the build and delivery of a replacement floating bridge until such time as it commences operation.” BCTQ’s obligations under the consultancy agreement include (but are not limited to) the following:

1. Undertaking a review of the operation of the (now previous) floating bridge and demonstrate an understanding of issues then current;
2. Establishing the key stakeholders (including Cowes Harbour Commission CHC) and the Maritime and Coastguard Agency (MCA) and undertaking a baseline audit of their requirements which may impact upon the design of a new floating bridge;
3. Producing an outline design and specification together with a statement of requirements for the new floating bridge to detail the construction class, requirements for all testing, installation, bringing into service and staff training;
4. Overseeing the construction of the new bridge with the company appointed as a result of the tender process to include attendance at technical meetings at the selected shipyard;
5. Approval of the shipyard detailed design and construction drawings;
6. Attendance at shipyard and final trials;
7. Overseeing the delivery, bringing into service and commencement of operation of a replacement floating bridge (which was, at this stage, envisaged to be by October 2016);
8. Ensuring that at the end of the Consultancy Agreement the council has a clear, structured and fully costed plan detailing the preventative maintenance schedule for the new bridge; and
9. Advice to the council during the warranty period

6.2 Ship Builder: The council entered into a contract on 29 March 2016 “for the design and construction of a drive through, roll-on roll-off chain ferry with articulated hydraulically operating loading and unloading ramps at each end of the vehicle deck and an enclosed weather proof passenger shelter and an offset pilot house” and a deed of variation to that contract with Mainstay Marine Solutions Ltd.

6.2.1 Owner’s Representative: The Managing Director of the King Harry Ferry based in Falmouth was appointed as the Owners Representative on 20 July 2015, to provide technical support to the Council’s Project Manager and to liaise between the shipbuilder and naval architect on the build and delivery of Floating Bridge 6. The Managing Director is a respected member of the Floating Bridge Operators Group and appears to have a wealth of knowledge on operating a successful floating bridge service.

6.2.2 In essence there were 3 phases of the role:

1. Planning up to selection of the yard
2. Build, delivery and acceptance trials through to operations training
3. First year snagging and development

- 6.2.3 Project Manager: The Commercial Services Manager was assigned as the Isle of Wight Council's Project Manager throughout the life of this project and has overseen the project from conception to date. He was the assigned responsible officer for planning the management of the project on a day to day basis and providing all relevant reports. The Project Manager has significant experience of managing contracts of a similar size and scale for the council. However, there was no specific information available that provided job specific information, setting out the Project Manger role or the responsibilities required of him for this project, that the Director of Economy and Environment had discussed or agreed with the Project Manager at the start of the project.
- 6.3 Given the significant importance of the Solent Gateway project (of which the floating bridge was a part) to all of its partners, the then Director of Economy and the Environment led for the council on the delivery of this project as a whole. When he left the council in November 2013, this role was assumed by the then Assistant Director of Economy and the Environment who continued in the role until December 2015. This role was different to that of the 'project sponsor' for the floating bridge element of the gateways project; this was considered, given its scale, and the organisation's capacity to be capable of being dealt with through the normal service management arrangements. No additional resources were requested for this purpose.
- 6.4 Head of Service / Strategic Manager: These posts are responsible for the delivery of a range of services within their area of responsibility, and the capital and revenue expenditure associated with each of the services for which they are responsible. The management of the floating bridge has, since 2013 been within the remit of the Head of Commercial Services.
- 6.5 Service Director: A Service Director is responsible for advising the council on strategic policy and budget decisions and for ensuring services are delivered in accordance with the council's budget and policy framework. A number of changes in the council meant that the floating bridge fell within the portfolio of the Director and then Assistant Director for Economy and the Environment, Deputy Managing Director and then the Chief Executive with increasing levels of delegation to Heads of Service Managers until September 2016 when a Head of Place was appointed.
- 6.6 Project Sponsor (Project Executive role): The role of the Project Sponsor is to hold overall responsibility for the delivery and project success. It is considered to be a key decision making role and to ensure the project is focused on delivering the product and for appointing the rest of the project team.

7 Specification/ Design / Construction

- 7.1 At the start of the procurement process the Project Manager for the council arranged a suppliers day on the 2 December 2014 in order to present an outline of the project for replacing the floating bridge to a range of naval architects and ship builders and seek their views on the best way to deliver the project given the tight deadlines associated with the likely grant funding. The event was attended by the Assistant Director for Economy and Environment and the Council Member for Transport. In total 10 shipbuilders and 3 naval architects attended and the general consensus was, that the traditional route to market was the better solution, which meant that the tenders were advertised through the Official Journal of the European Union (OJEU) and included technical questions relating specifically to the suitability of the qualifications and experience of the bidding company for the services required. This involved the successful:

- Naval Architect to prepare an outline design and technical specification
- Shipbuilder to prepare the detailed design and build to be checked by the naval architect.

7.2 Requirements for the vessel Floating Bridge 6

7.2.1 The Funding Agreement approval by the SLEP on 21 March 2016 indicated that the funding had been approved on the basis of the business case originally submitted in June 2015. There were a number of key objectives detailed in this business case for the replacement ferry and these are summarised as:

- Provide direct pedestrian access between the two town centres of East and West Cowes, to ensure their future vitality and competitiveness in a global tourism market;
- Allow for continued river access upstream for commercial and private vessels with an air draft of up to 200 ft and maintain the existing water draft of up to a minimum of 1.3m;
- Provide continuity of river crossings during the delivery period (of the new floating bridge);
- Improve reliability in operation, which has become more critical since the reserve ferry was decommissioned in 1982;
- Minimise congestion on the local road network, particularly where this negatively impacts the economic potential of town centres;
- Ensure affordable fares for a population that experiences high levels of deprivation;
- Safeguard and enhance the value for money of the substantial delivery of the East Cowes Project Masterplan, adopted in 2006 and subsequent planning permission in October 2007;
- Enhance environmental sustainability, through reduced operational energy requirements and carbon emissions.

Tenders

7.2.2 The Tender submissions received from Naval Architects were reviewed by a panel that consisted of:

- Commercial Services Manager, Isle of Wight Council (The Project Manager)
- Fleet Manager, Isle of Wight Council (The Former Floating Bridge Service Manager and Engineer providing technical advice)
- Managing Director of the King Harry Steam Ferry Company Ltd (Owners Representative for the project)

7.2.3 It appears there was no political oversight of the panel review process.

7.2.4 The panel appointed, Burness Corlett Three Quays (BCTQ) who had demonstrated their experience and expertise in designing floating bridges as Naval Architects.

7.2.5 BCTQ then developed the technical specification following discussions with stakeholders in September 2015 to engage a shipbuilder. The requirements for floating bridge 6 were set out in in the replacement of the floating bridge statement of requirements which was prepared by Burness Corlett Three Quays (BCTQ) and the agreed outcomes which detailed:

- Reduce queuing times (foot passengers and vehicles).

- Increase number of daily crossings (introduce timetable service 6 crossings per hour).
- Shorter turnaround times (depends on efficiency of fare collection time & smart ticketing).
- Greater vehicle capacity.
- Separation of vehicles and foot passengers when loading/unloading.
- Improved passenger accommodation.
- Reduce carbon emissions.
- Improved energy efficiency.
- Reduced running costs (reduce refit time and one dry docking after 5 years).
- Increase clearance over chains from 1.3m to preferably 2.5m.
- Iconic Design.
- Reduce vessel protrusions into the channel especially at low water.
- Car deck to be preferably flat or with a slight reverse sheer.
- Ramps to have higher stowage angles.
- Options for preventing grounding on the slipway.
- Fendering for tugs.
- Lifelines underneath fendering.
- To be constructed from steel.
- Single high mounted wheelhouse offset with good visibility and to avoid restricting the car lane below.
- Passenger accommodation to be single sided with interior seating and upper deck seating.
- Glass windows for good outboard views, no WC, electronic screens for advertising and information.
- Back ground heating for passenger area.
- Keel coolers, dry exhaust with silencers.

The Tender submissions received from Shipbuilders were reviewed by a panel that consisted of:

- Commercial Services Manager, Isle of Wight Council (The Project Manager)
- A representative of BCTQ (Naval Architects)
- Managing Director of the Kings Harry Steam Ferry Company Ltd (Owners Representative for the project)

Mainstay Marine Solutions Ltd were appointed as the shipbuilders following the tender process

7.3 Construction of the vessel issues raised

7.3.1 During initial consultation with stakeholders on the specification prepared by BCTQ, Cowes Harbour Master and the floating bridge crew had the opportunity to give their input into the design of floating bridge 6 and raise any issues they felt needed to be considered by the designers. These were:

- the depth of water over the chains especially at ebb tides (Cowes Harbour Master also wanted the council to explore the possibility of increasing the height of water over the chains so that in the future larger, commercial vessels would be able to gain access to the River Medina).
- the increased length of the prows which may cause loading /unloading problems

Depth of water over the chains

7.3.2 In response to this concern the council's Project Manager instructed BCTQ to produce a further report in March 16 from BCTQ (Cowes replacement Floating Bridge – Chain Extension Study)

7.3.3 The report recommended that in order to achieve the required chain depth across the river (which was detailed as 'a clearance of 2m below chart datum over a width of at least 30m when the tide height is over 2m) the following activities be carried out:

- During the planned maintenance works to the slipways, in preparation of the new chain ferry, the chain pits be cleaned out, the weights replaced for easier shaped weights which can easily be removed or added to achieve the desired weight to ensure optimum performance.
- The river bed dredged by an additional 1.5m across a width of at least 30m
- The length of both chains increase by a nominal length of 0.5m. The chain length being monitored and adjusted by moving the shackle attachment points.

These recommendations took into account the conceptual arrangement of the proposed new floating bridge and were made based on the following conditions:

- Data obtained from the 2011 Survey carried out to establish the depth at which the chains are sitting across the river.
- The current chain size.

The report stated that a combination of reducing the counterbalance weights and increasing the chain length by 0.5 m would achieve the depth of water above the chains to the desired clearance. However the report also noted that any increase in length of chain may cause an increase in deviation from the original track the ferry takes when crossing the river. The report stated that with the new, wider, ferry, this increase in deviation may be too great from an operational aspect to warrant any change to the current system in relation to the chain length and/or the counterbalance weight.

In preparation for the arrival of floating bridge 6 works were carried out to the chain pits, chains and slipways. Any dredging of the river needs to be arranged with the harbour master and, to date, none has taken place. There are still concerns of the depth of water over the chains on the ebb tides which the council is seeking to resolve through external advisors. Subject to the results of this advice and current testing these recommendations should be revisited

Length of the prows

7.3.4 In response with regard to the length of the prow which it was thought might lead to loading issues, Mainstay as ship builders checked the design of the prow and the angle of docking to the slipway through their CAD system. This check did not identify any issues with the specification. The extension of the prow remains an option to address the disembarkation and embarkation of vehicles.

8 Concerns raised following the arrival of floating bridge

There have been a number of concerns raised by stakeholders regarding the floating bridge which include:

- Size and specification of the vessel
- Noise created by the vessel
- Depth of water over the chains
- Training of staff
- Passenger safety
- Procurement process


8.1 Size of the vessel

8.1.1 There have been a number of queries and statements made about the size of Floating Bridge 6 being far greater than the former Floating Bridge 5. The comparative data on the build sizes for the both Floating Bridge 5 and 6 are detailed in the table and design overlay drawings below:

Comparative Specifications Specification	Floating Bridge 5	Floating Bridge 6
Length of prows (ramps raised in operational position)	37.2 metres	37.4 metres
Length of Hull	26.67 metres	29.7 metres
Breadth Moulded (vehicle deck)	12.80 metres	14.00 metres
Depth moulded	2.59 metres	2.65 metres
Height of passenger deck above vehicle deck	0	2.35 metres
Height of pilot house above passenger deck	2.3 metres	3.35 metres
Hull weight	175 tonnes	262 tonnes
Hull weight fully loaded	234 tonnes	333 tonnes
Car capacity	15	20
Passenger capacity	Not known	138
Passenger capacity with no vehicles	400	400
Endurance from full tanks	Not known	18 days

8.1.2 The drawings of floating bridge 6 shown in black ink have been overlaid on the drawings of floating bridge 5 shown in red ink to demonstrate pictorially the differences in specification. Although it is clear that Floating Bridge 6 is taller than Floating Bridge 5, this was a requirement of the specification to allow for the upper passenger deck and wheel house. However, the length of the vessel is almost the same to that of Floating Bridge 5 with raised prows in their respective operational crossing positions with just 20cm difference and the width is 1.2m wider than Floating Bridge 5.

Diagram of size comparison in operational crossing state and with prows extended:



8.2 The contract with Mainstay together with the Specification produced by BCTQ (which is incorporated into the contract with Mainstay) provides for a series of trials to be carried out on the Vessel. The majority of these trials have been completed. Following Floating Bridge 6 being towed from its dock in Pembrokeshire, to enter into service, it was the responsibility of Mainstay shipbuilders to ensure that the vessel was fit for purpose and to seek confirmation from the Maritime and Coast Guard Agency (MCA) that the vessel met the required standards. The only outstanding trials are those relating to noise and vibration. It is understood that Mainstay cannot complete the noise and vibration trials until the chains have been tensioned so that the Floating Bridge can operate at all tidal states with sufficient clearance over the chains. The council is seeking an expert opinion as to whether or not this is possible and / or how this can be achieved.

8.2.1 On the 11 May 2017 the MCA undertook the inspection whereby they identified 15 issues. These were categorised:

- 9 issues rated as action code 17 – these required completion before the vessel could enter service
- 2 issues rated as action code 16 – these required resolution within 2 weeks of inspection
- 4 issues rated as action code 99 - these required completion over a longer period no later than 10 August 2017

8.2.2 By the following day (12 May) Mainstay had confirmed that all the code 17 issues had been resolved and this information was relayed to the MCA and the vessel subsequently commenced service on the 13 May providing a crossing service across the Medina River between East and West Cowes.

- 8.2.3 On the 14 May the vessel experienced a loss of power whilst just off the East Cowes slipway. After getting the vessel back onto the slipway and disembarking the vehicles and foot passengers the crew were able to establish that the problem was caused by a faulty connection in the pilot house which was rectified that afternoon.
- 8.2.4 As a result of the electrical incident and the vessel being dead in the water in terms of loss of power the MCA undertook a routine follow up visit on the 15 May and a further visit on 2 June 2017; this highlighted that:
- Three code 17 issues identified on the MCA original visit had not been satisfactorily resolved prior to departure and go live
 - The crew were not sufficiently familiar with the operation of the vessel.
 - The MCA were content that the original cause of the electrical failure had been identified and remedied; it was clear that elements of the electrical system had been designed in such a way that the risk of losing propulsion through the failure of a non – critical component was unacceptable. MCA requested that the builder undertook a critical analysis of the various systems to identify any potential weaknesses such as the one which caused the failure over the weekend and proposed any necessary corrective action to be completed no later than 10 August 2017. This work was duly completed.

Owner's Representative

- 8.2.5 It was a requirement of the Owner's representative role, as set out in the role specification as part of phase 2 and 3 to provide support to the Project Manager during the move of the Floating Bridge from the shipyard to Cowes, acceptance trials, operations training and first year snagging and development needs. The review team has established that as the Owner's Representative support ended once the floating bridge left the shipyard on 6 April 2017. This was an issue that the Project Manager should have considered escalating to senior management, in order that it was sighted on and clear about this change in expectation. Project reporting by exception would not however have raised this issue if this change was not recognised or of no immediate concern to the Project Manager.
- 8.2.6 The contractual arrangement with the Owner's Representative allows for continued call off works as required. However, it was evident to the Review team during discussions that the Project Manager and Owner's Representative had differing views in terms of why the involvement of the Owner's Representative role ended on delivery of the vessel to the Island. As there was no formal council oversight (through a Project Board, for example) for the project there was no opportunity to question the impact of this change on the project as a whole although it might be expected that it was raised with senior managers. Escalating this to senior management or a Project Board may have clarified the need for either ending or retaining continued involvement of the Owner's Representative in the project beyond the point at which the Floating Bridge was brought to the Island.
- 8.2.7 The review was unable to determine from the evidence available of the Project Risk Register or Council Risk Report that there was any risk identified of this role leaving or finishing during the project prior to completion, given the importance of the role specification it is perhaps considered this should have been captured and mitigations noted.

8.2.8 Given the Owner's Representative's previous experience in managing and accepting a new-build Chain Ferry it may have been beneficial to have maintained the specified role to date during, for example, trials and training of staff to support the Project Manager and Ferry Operational Manager in the provision of the Floating Bridge service.

8.3 Remedial Action

8.3.1 The first two issues raised by the MCA required rectification before the vessel could re-enter service. Mainstay delivered additional training for all staff and worked with the council to prepare more detailed training and competency logs. This work was carried out without any undue delay. However the review established the initial training provided was insufficient and subsequent training improved the service delivery. The benefit of this has been highlighted by the recent trial of the vessel during December.

8.3.2 The MCA then undertook a further inspection on 2 June 2017 to analyse the critical electrical system failure, the work to be completed by 10 August.

8.4 Issues since entering service

8.4.1 A number of issues have been experienced following the vessel entering service on the 13 May 2017.

Vehicles grounding as they embark / disembark the vessel

8.4.2 Further training for the crew has ensured that they are more competent in docking the vessel. By bringing the vessel in closer to the shore this has in turn reduced the angle between the ramp and the slipway and reduced the likelihood of vehicles grounding. Modelling of the slip way has also been undertaken by Mainstay and it has been confirmed that subject to the correct placement of the vessel and deployment of the ramp there should be no issue unless a vehicle has lowered suspension or approaches beyond a reasonable speed.

Increased noise levels

8.4.3 There have been some noise issues which have been the subject of complaints by nearby residents, which appear to be caused by wheel bearings, movement of chain wheels and the landing of the prows on the slipways creating a boom effect under the prow, which is being addressed. Consideration is being given to replacing the chain wheels and bearings as well as looking at solutions to limit the noise produced by the prows landing.

8.4.4 The prow on Floating Bridge 5 was gravity fed but the Floating Bridge 6 is a hydraulic function. As such it has taken the crew a little time to familiarise themselves with the change in the way they need to operate this control bringing the prow gradually closer to the slipway as they approach the shore. This change in operation has reduced the noise level when the vessel docks.

8.4.5 The design of the prow lends itself to create a boom when the prow hits the slipway. The team are investigating with the support of a Noise Consultant to determine how the noise can be limited and reduced. One such option may be the fitting of acoustic matting to the underneath of the prow so that the echo space is reduced and the noise muffled but no final solution has been determined yet. Operational times are also under consideration to limit noise caused by Floating Bridge 6.

Material used for wheels and bearings

- 8.4.6 Although the floating bridge has not been operational for very long it would appear that a number of the main drive wheels, mainly the cast iron ones are becoming worn and need replacing with harder wearing steel wheels. Equally the bearings that hold the wheels are made of nylon, which was the recommended material as part of the specification and design process, but does not seem to be as durable as the original FB5 bronze bearings.
- 8.4.7 The fact that both the bearings and wheels are wearing is contributing to the noise that is created by the ferry due to the flexible movement and wearing of the wheels. This issue is currently being investigated by the Project Manager.

Depth of water over the chains

- 8.4.8 One of the main issues with the vessel and a factor in the grounding and non-operation around low water is that of insufficient clearance above the chains during all tidal states.
- 8.4.9 The chains were adjusted on the 26 June 17 in an attempt to provide sufficient clearance over the chains, however a level of clearance sufficient to satisfy the harbour master was not achievable. Accordingly, the harbour master was not willing, at that time to allow the floating bridge to operate at all states of the tide. The council has appointed an independent expert to explore any possible solutions to address this situation. Further tests will be carried out shortly before Christmas and again on 29/30 January when there will be a large tidal range. It is anticipated that following these further tests the council's appointed independent expert advisers will be in a position to propose possible resolutions and the council will review the position at this stage.
- 8.4.10 The technical specification for the new floating bridge acknowledged the environmental combined conditions to enable the service to be maintained. The document points to a Tidal Stream Southbound of 4 knots; a Tidal stream Northbound (ebbing) of 5 knots; and wind speed up to 55 knots.
- 8.4.11 A number of concerns raised by members of the public have suggested that the environmental conditions have not been fully considered in the design, operation and tension of the chains of the vessel and assurances over the size and height of the vessel being able to operate in these environmental conditions has not been evidenced. The Review team have not been able to substantiate whether a 'proof of concept' model or test was undertaken to determine how the vessel might work in the live environment taking into account the technical specification environmental needs set out. This matter has been referred to our legal team. However, in the BCTQ Project Update minutes of 1 December 2015, it outlines a number of queries raised by the Cowes Harbour Commission to address these matters for consideration.

Training of the Floating Bridge Crew

- 8.4.12 The floating bridge crew receive some 60 hours of training annually together with ongoing continual assessment to ensure that they are competent to carry out their role. Processes and procedures are documented in the safety manual which sets out the operational requirements of both the crew and the vessel.

- 8.4.13 With the introduction of the Floating Bridge 6 there have been two further training requirements added to the training programme 1) sea survival/ man overboard 2) VHF licence which is an exam based qualification.
- 8.4.14 All of the crew hold the floating bridge operators certificate (FBOC). They receive their basic training from Red Ensign Ltd. All crew are then required to complete a competency task assessment; the activities of which have been compiled by the floating bridge supervisor, (who holds the L20 assessors qualification), and as such he is a qualified training assessor. Each crew member is continually assessed on their work activities to ensure they are competent in their role and each crew member is finally 'signed off' by the Harbour master as qualified to work on the river.
- 8.4.15 As such the crew members are highly trained in operating the floating bridge vessel but from discussions with the crew they felt that there was insufficient time given to crew members for them to familiarise themselves with the differences in controls and trial the vessel prior to the Floating Bridge 6 entering into service in May 2017, which would have allowed them to be more confident in management of the vessel.
- 8.4.16 The crew must also adhere to the procedures detailed within the domestic safety manual. This manual has been developed by the Floating Bridge supervisor with some assistance from the Owners Representative and details the procedures and actions to be taken should an emergency occur.
- 8.4.17 When the incident occurred which led to the vessel being dead in the water as a result of an electrical outage, the floating bridge crew followed the agreed procedure to the letter. Understandably the public were unhappy at the delay this issue caused in getting the vessel back to shore, which was seen by the public that the floating bridge crew were not competent. The crew followed procedural guidance and the crew demonstrated their competence in the correct handling of the situation.

Suspension of service

- 8.4.18 The Vessel was taken out of service on 4th September due to a number of concerns including the level of clearance above the chains such that it was unable to operate at all states of the tide and noise issues. It was considered that these issues could be investigated and resolved more quickly if the Vessel was taken out of service. A further factor in the decision to take the Vessel out of service was the lack of certainty that could be given to the public about when the Vessel would be in service in light of the issues experienced and tides, such that no regular service could be run.

8.5 Procurement process

- 8.5.1 Price Waterhouse Coopers (PWC) conducted an independent review of the procurement process undertaken in procuring floating bridge 6 and concluded that the vessel had been procured in line with the council's procurement process. (Appendix 4 - R122)

8.6 Loss of revenue for businesses

- 8.6.1 Clearly the loss of the floating bridge 6 service has impacted on the flow of pedestrians across the river Medina, which in turn has had the potential to affect the revenue of local businesses. As such the Review Team are in discussion with the council's revenues manager as to the feasibility of providing assistance by means of a discretionary rate relief scheme. The SLEP had also offered to consider support in

some form for businesses who have suffered impact from the service failure. This matter will be explored and considered further in the New Year.

8.7 **Loss of revenue for the council**

- 8.7.1 Whilst the floating bridge is not fully operational the council is not only losing revenue but is also funding the Jenny Lee service. As at the 31st October the forecasted cost of the floating bridge being out of normal service amounts to £832,000.

8.8 **Emerging issues**

- 8.8.1 It is clear that there are lessons to be learnt by the council from the introduction of floating bridge 6, which need to be borne in mind in the future when managing and implementing such high profile projects. These findings include:

Governance arrangements

- 8.8.2 A governance structure for the floating bridge project was proposed in the business case to the SLEP, submitted as part of the final case for the Solent Gateways Project in September 2015. It seem likely that this was the last version of a number of iterations which were focused on addressing the SLEPs concerns raised during its due diligence processes (in relation to finance and state aid) and that it did not capture some of changes to personnel and approach that were a legacy of much earlier drafts on which the final submission was based.
- 8.8.3 The Review Team have not seen any evidence of the council's formal governance arrangements for the delivery of the project; which tends to support the supposition that it was intended to be delivered through normal service management arrangements (one to one supervision, service boards and capital challenge meetings), as has been and continues to be the case, with many of the council's other similar capital projects. This approach also reflects the overall limited management capacity of the council at the time of the project's inception and, to some degree, confidence in the capability and experience of the Project Manager.
- 8.8.4 The creation of a formal project board, with clearly agreed roles and responsibilities, would have provided the Project Manager with a key point of reference in delivering the project and offered a degree of check and challenge to the delivery process. This would have supported decisions taken by the Project Manager and avoided a need to deal with issues by exception through a service delivery approach and where the exception is generally defined by the Project Manager themselves. In the case of the floating bridge project, however, it is difficult to determine what might have been different during the procurement and construction phase of the project as the problems only began to emerge as the vessel was being commissioned.
- 8.8.5 Even at the point of preparing to commission the floating bridge the council had the opportunity to review the plans for receiving and testing the floating bridge before putting it back into service. This could have taken a longer term view of the messages to be communicated to the public in order to manage expectations about the new facility. This was however, not given due consideration as, given the skills and experience of the appointed contractors to the design and build of the vessel, it was not expected to fail.

- 8.8.6 There was no evidence available to the Review Team of any strategic project board regularly meeting to oversee the delivery of the Solent Gateways Project of which the floating bridge formed a part. The review had established from the available documents that as part of the SLEP Business Case available, a floating bridge governance structure was indicated but the evidence available suggests that there were just two recorded meetings held on 25 March 2015 and 6 May 2015, this being at the initiation tender stage of the project.
- 8.8.7 It is acknowledged, however, that a Solent Gateway project executive (officer) group led firstly by Parose Projects and then by BPP Regeneration and funded by RWP, met extensively during 2014/15 in order to complete the works required by SLEP to secure the £15m of funding offered to match the £15m of private sector funding for the project as a whole. This work, of which the council was a key part, concluded with the submission of a detailed whole project business case to the SLEP for its consideration. The Solent Gateways project, it is understood, has now secured conditional approval from the SLEP but is not able to progress as a whole at this time.
- 8.8.8 It is perhaps not surprising that the wider Solent Gateways Project Board did not meet more regularly during the project, given the challenges to the partners in securing SLEP funding and which were being addressed by the executive group. In the light of this information the council may have considered implementing its own Members' board, including key councillors, to oversee the project to the point that the vessel was brought to the Island, which would have provided a holistic overview of the project throughout the critical stages of the project.
- 8.8.9 Given this project was of strategic importance, greater governance would have assisted in providing clarity of roles and responsibilities, a greater challenge to decisions being made by separating responsibility resting entirely with the Council's Project Manager; and could have aided the communication process. However as previously stated there was a lack of strategic oversight of the project.
- 8.8.10 It appears to the Review Team that officers had been assigned to the operational management of the Floating Bridge and overseeing the project by the former Director in the early stages of forming the project. There appears to have been little clarity or understanding of the formal management and reporting arrangements as the project progressed.
- 8.8.11 The Review Team identified that, notwithstanding the submissions made to the SLEP, the council did not have a clear, shared view of the role or place of the Project Sponsor in the delivery of the floating bridge at any one time. This was made more complicated by the loss, and also the rapidly evolving roles, of key senior managers from November 2013 onwards. Only the service and project management remained consistent over this period. Both the Director of Economy and Environment and the Assistant Director when taking over from the Director after he left the council, were of the very clear view that they had a strategic role in securing the delivery of the Solent Gateways Project as a whole and the funding for the floating bridge and the East Cowes town centre improvements in particular. They delegated functions through the normal line management arrangements (as set out for example, in the April 2016 to September 2017 Service Plan for the 'Place' directorate) to ensure the council's responsibilities to the wider partnership, the SLEP and the local community were delivered.
- 8.8.12 There is the potential that the role played by the Director and then the Assistant Director of Economy and Environment in the delivery of the Solent Gateways Project

caused some confusion in the operational staff team but it would seem that it was keen to get on and deliver the floating bridge project regardless. There are no identifiable concerns having been raised by the Project Manager or from within the service area. It is understood that the Assistant Director discussed the potential for additional resources to be made available to the service in order to support the delivery of the floating bridge project, but this offer was declined by the service.

8.8.13 .This apparent lack of governance oversight had the potential to place the Project Manager in a difficult position when managing the project. Ideally, in major projects, key decisions would be taken by a board, led by a Project Sponsor responsible for the delivery of the project and ensuring it is adequately resourced. In this instance the Project Manager was suitably qualified and experienced to deliver this project, having already delivered a number of other projects on behalf of the council. Therefore whilst it would have been helpful to provide some clarity and constraints on the remit for this project, none was provided but the role was understood by the Project Manager. The Review Team have concluded that decision making was left to the Project Manager with a lack of project decision controls in place, although it has identified at least one decision, the place of the Owner's representative, that could have benefited from wider consideration by senior management, a project board or similar. This further supports the conclusion that greater strategic oversight was needed.

8.8.14 The Head of Place advised that she took on overall operational responsibility for the Floating Bridge at the time of her appointment in September 2016, when the Head of Commercial Services reported to her from that point. Both the Head of Place and Head of Commercial Services became more actively involved at the point that the issues outlined in this report became apparent in May 2017, just after the Floating Bridge first entered service, to try to address and support the Project Manager to manage and address the issues that had materialised.

8.9 There is some evidence of briefing reports being provided to the Executive member (at that time) that were then provided to Full Council meetings.

- The first such report on the build progress was presented on 15 June 2016;
- Then the 20 July 2016 (both reports implied "expected to be delivered and operational by January 2017".
- A further briefing report 21 September 2016 updated on the construction implied "it was progressing well and would be operational January/February 2017".
- However, the briefing provided to Full Council 19 October 2016 implied that "there were a few technical and design challenges".
- A further briefing report on 18 January 2017 updated on the Slipway works but no other issues to be aware of.
- A further report of 15 March 2017 from the New Cabinet Member for Transport indicated "a target date to open the Floating Bridge service would be 6 May 2017".

- 8.10 These reports were provided directly by the Project Manager as these updates were provided by way of executive member reports to Full Council. As these were not formal reports, this did not provide any means by which progress monitoring could be fully undertaken, or for any appropriate scrutiny to take place.
- 8.11 A quarterly Finance spend report was provided to the LEP by the Project Manager to make them aware of progress in terms of the grant funding conditions.
- 8.12 Discussions between the Owners Representative and Project Manager appear to have regularly taken place post each project site visits to the ship build yard. These were usually by email setting out the project progress and also by phone call. The Council's Project Manager would then note any issues that needed to be raised and discussed with BCTQ, who in turn would discuss with Mainstay and if required at the collective Project Steering Group Meetings between the parties mentioned.
- 8.13 From the discussions held with key officers there appears to be a lack of clarity, a blurring of lines of accountability and a lack of communication between the reporting lines of the Project Manager in line with standard project governance.
- 8.14 The review team has identified the need for improvement in future strategic project management.

Engagement and Communication

- 8.15 Although there was a high level stakeholder analysis, there is little evidence as to how these groups have been communicated with regarding various phases of the build. It is not clear as to how key stakeholders such as the town and parish councils were kept informed of events, although there was information provided to the team of a project briefing update with Cowes and East Cowes Town Council was provided on 19 May 2016.
- 8.16 There was a webcam set up in the dockyard to keep interested parties informed on the build of the vessel which was promoted through the council's website and social media. The volume of website hits to the floating bridge site suggests that there was an interest in the floating bridge build and residents were accessing information available through the website.
- 8.17 The crew themselves made recommendations but they felt their views were not listened to nor were they kept up to date with the build of the new vessel. As they were deployed to alternative duties following the removal of service of floating bridge 5 there were perhaps greater efforts needed to keep them fully informed of progress on the project and greater consideration to improving communication links with the team.
- 8.18 Considerations as to the use of mobility scooters on the floating bridge could have been discussed in greater depth if there had been more effective stakeholder engagement. A full assessment of the impact of the new floating bridge service on the service users and accessibility appears to be lacking and should also be considered as part of the evaluation of the trial period.
- 8.19 The greatest asset of any organisation is its staff. Concerns about staff training and familiarisation were identified at an early stage when the Floating Bridge first entered into service in May 2017 and were addressed.

8.20 There is evidence of a detailed training and competency programme having been developed. The review report has already commented on the appropriateness of whether there was sufficient time and attention paid to the staff in preparing for operating the floating bridge 6 when it went live in May 2017, but training and knowledge should not be seen as a one off process to tick a box and therefore ongoing assurance of competencies and checking would be advisable as part of the operational needs.

9 Recommendations

9.1 Governance of projects

9.1.1 It is the view of the Review Team that in all cases in the future, all large strategic projects must have an appropriate Project Board established, where there is collective responsibility for decisions made and there is both support and challenge of project managers to get the best outcomes from delivery of the project.

9.1.2 The board will need to give consideration to the changes in skill sets of staff and processes that a project delivering change will bring and factor these changes into the project plan.

9.1.3 In addition, the project plan must also include effective communication and working with local members and communities, being more transparent in changes that are planned so there can be improved engagement and consultation with stakeholder groups.

9.1.4 The Project Manager role is to oversee the project management on a day to day basis, reporting to the Project Board and seeking approval for deviations to the project plan. The role in terms of a Project Sponsor needs to be equally responsible for overseeing the project's success and ensuring key decisions are made appropriately to keep the project focused.

9.1.5 The Isle of Wight Council has over recent years seen its resources shrink significantly but equally there is a need for due diligence to be applied to the project resource in considering whether those managing a project:

- Have appropriate capacity over and above other duties (the project manager had both operational management duties across a range of services and was also running other projects);
- Skills and needs analysis for the project;
- Understanding of the roles and responsibilities – clearly defined roles and governance structures in place to ensure that the project is managed though all levels; there is separation of roles and appropriate assurance is in place throughout the life of the project;
- A clearly defined and documented handover process to ensure project continuity when any individual joins or take over any role in the project.

9.1.6 There is perhaps a need to review what is scoped and defined for specific roles and responsibilities. The Review Team determined that although the Owner's Representative role had specified that it would support the project through trials and operations training, it has not been involved in the project since April 2017. It is

recommended that if specific roles to support a project are defined that are later determined as requiring a change of remit, that these be formally noted and approved by a Project Board to ensure that risk and mitigation is formally managed and the appropriate provisions remain in place.

- 9.1.7 It is clear that insufficient time was allowed between the vessel arriving in Cowes and being entered into service, in order to carry out familiarisation and training of staff (clarified further below). Given the delay in the vessel being brought to Cowes there seemed to be a perceived urgency to commence the service. However no clear evidence could be found to establish if this was actually the case, with the SLEP indicating this was not so.

Greater governance in terms of a Project Board led by the Project Sponsor would no doubt have ensured that there was a more robust plan in place to manage the vessel being entered into service and clear lines of communication/decisions to avoid any assumptions, which may have avoided many of the issues that occurred during the early days of operation.

Overall findings identified that greater attention needs to be given to the recording of risks within the risk register which would have highlighted problems that a Project Board should have had sight of.

9.2 **Preparing for live service**

- 9.2.1 With the vessel only being put on its chains 3 May 2017 (although the slip way works were not completed until 9 May 2017) and then the vessel became operational on 13 May 2017, it is the view of the Review Team that the period in which to train staff, familiarise them, trial and test operational processes was inadequate.
- 9.2.2 It would have been more appropriate for the decision to bring Floating Bridge 6 into service to be passed to a Project Board once it was satisfied that all operational and project build aspects have been met fully, and to have an independent eye on the assurance of readiness to operate over an agreed period of time.
- 9.2.3 The Review Team are of the opinion that the vessel should not have been put into service over a weekend and should have been commissioned during the week, as this decision hampered the support offered to the trial service when the difficulties occurred. This should be considered in the future should similar projects be undertaken and include an appropriate impact assessment.

9.3 **Engagement & Communication**

- 9.3.1 Engaging with stakeholders on any project and keeping them informed of what is planned can only add benefit to the delivery of the outcomes of the project. Greater thought needs to be given to whom the stakeholders are in the delivery of projects and every effort undertaken to keep them informed by means of the various communication methods including social media.
- 9.3.2 While there is some evidence of engagement with stakeholders there has been some question over the identified level of stakeholders and the provision of a detailed stakeholder engagement plan for the life of the project. Greater consideration needs to be given to stakeholder involvement in projects so that interested parties can be included in the journey of any project. The plan should remain a live working document and be refreshed as appropriate to reflect the changes identified during the course of the project.

9.3.3 The floating bridge has its own website page which could be further used to promote the service. Although it is difficult to advertise a timetable due to the many variances that could impact on the service, there is the opportunity to improve and set customer expectations.

9.3.4 The use of face book and twitter could be used to not only provide information to promote the floating bridge service but also culture a service user group which hopefully would build customer relationships.

9.4 **Competency of the crew**

9.4.1 Given the late delivery of the vessel and the fact there was a perceived urgency for the vessel to be launched into service which meant there was insufficient time to enable the crew to familiarise themselves with the vessel. This lack of familiarisation gave the impression that the crew was not competent and therefore a lack of respect from those using the vessel.

9.4.2 In fact, the Review team have established that the crew are highly qualified and competent in their role but just needed to be given appropriate time to familiarise themselves with the operation of the new vessel.

9.4.3 During the period the floating bridge service has been suspended the crew have been able to familiarise themselves with the new vessel, so the recommendation is that adequate time needs to be given to the crew to continue with their training programme in a live testing environment to ensure that the floating bridge service remains efficient and safe.

10 **Conclusion**

10.1 The council secured an experienced team of contractors (Owner's Representative, Naval Architect and Shipbuilder), to design and build Floating Bridge 6. It also allocated an experienced Project Manager to be responsible for the planning and day to day running of the project. This gave the council the best opportunity to deliver a floating bridge to meet its required outcomes as set out elsewhere in this report.

10.2 There were no issues identified with the replacement of the floating bridge until the vessel arrived at Cowes and went into service. At this point a number of issues emerged including the depth of water over the chains and noise issues which led to the vessel being withdrawn from service. These appear to be a matter of design which cannot be commented on further at this stage.

The design issues continue to be investigated by the commercial services team assisted by external technical consultants and are now subject to ongoing legal discussions. The electrical issues identified have been addressed as they have arisen and have been resolved.

However there are a number of considerations and recommendation to be made which will improve the delivery of future strategic projects and enable lessons to be learned. These include:

- Ensuring project governance is in place and that responsibilities of roles are defined and structured so there is a clear escalation route of any issues to an operational project team and strategic project board;
- Ensure adequate resourcing of the project management function and not just adding this responsibility to an officer's day job

- Improving communication and engagement plans established within project documentation to identify and inform stakeholders, to ensure that this is owned and kept under constant review by the project board
- As with any change programme consideration also needs to be given to ensuring process changes that affect the functions undertaken by staff are clearly understood
- Ensure adequate time for staff training is planned with the project timeframes to ensure they are familiar and competent with new systems / functionality.
- Ensure appropriate political oversight

10.3 The suspension of the floating bridge service has been a significant cost to the council in not only the loss of revenue but also this situation has affected its working relationship with residents in East and West Cowes. To date the additional revenue cost to the council, to maintain the link between East and West Cowes, over and above the purchase price of the vessel, is over £832,000.

The Leader of the Council is committed to seeing this project through to its close and is keen to seek the views of all stakeholders in order to reach a satisfactory conclusion to providing a safe, affordable and reliable river crossing for Island residents and visitors for the foreseeable future.

10.4 Floating Bridge 6 is still to be accepted by the Council as an operational vessel.

APPENDIX 1

Listing of all staff and stakeholders contacted during the review

Peter Carter - Chain Ferry Supervisor
Mark Downer – Parking Operations Manager
Kevin George – Red Funnel
Tim Light – Owners Representative
Karl Love – Member for East Cowes
Stuart Love – Director of Economy & Environment
Sean Newton – Project Manager
Stuart McIntosh – Harbour Master
Anne Marie Mountfield - LEP representative
Alex Minns – Head of Commercial Services
John Metcalfe – Chief Executive Isle of Wight Council
Shirley Smart – Cabinet Member for Economy & Environment in 2014
Ian Stephens - Ex Leader of the Council
Nick Symes – Chain Ferry & Fleet Manager
Lora Peacey – Wilcox – Member for West Cowes
Wendy Perera – Head of Place
Floating Bridge Crew
Kirsten – Floaty Stakeholder Group

Appendix 2 - Floating Bridge Timeline

Date	Activity	Comments
2013	Highways PFI contract awarded and Floating Bridge Management transfers from IWC Highways to IWC Commercial Services	
2014	Solent Local Enterprise Partnership EP granted £15m of funding through the local growth deal	
2 nd December 2014	Suppliers Days takes place at Medina Theatre	
June 2015	Solent Gateways Business Case Released	Report by BBP Regeneration, noting FB5 is oldest bridge in the Country and due for replacement within 2 years
June 2015	Cowes – East Cowes Replacement and Modernisation Business Case FINAL	Report by Systra and Parose Projects for Isle of Wight Council
3 rd November 2015	Project update meeting with BCTQ	
1 st December 2015	Project update meeting with BCTQ	
25 th March 2015	Solent Gateways Project Board	Noted procurement processes to take place and identifies the project team members and notes that detailed design, build and commissioning will be undertaken within 10 months. It was agreed that this is a reasonable timescale bearing in mind that the bidders will have the outline design information during the Invitation To Tender period.
6 th May 2015	Solent Gateways Project Board	Noted issues with the Naval Architect selection process which ended up being re-advertised to attract greater interest.
22 nd May 2015	Pre-qualification questionnaire closing date	
25 th May – 10 th of June 2015	Evaluation of Invitation To Tender responses	
8 th June 2015	Presentations from Invitation to Tender responders	Commenced in this week
4 th June 2015	Procurement Board Waiver Request	For the appointment of the Owners Representative TL
23 rd June 2015	IWC informs BCTQ that their submission moves to stage 2	With 3 further shipbuilders

30 th June 2015	TL proposal for the remit of Owners Representative role for IWC	
1 st July 2015	Successful company to commence activity	
July 2015	Resubmission of Solent LEP Business Case	
20 th July 2015	Request for contract Price Variation for Owners Representative	Noted contract start date of 20 th July 2015 to 19 th of January 2018,
21 st July 2015	IWC informs BCTQ that they have been awarded the contract	
24 th July 2015	Initial contract meeting takes place	Meeting between IWC and BCTQ
August 2015	Invitation To Tender documents released	
August 2015	Stakeholder engagement activities	Number of engagements with stakeholders takes place
15 th September 2015	Replacement Floating Bridge Statement of Requirements Produced	Burness Corlett Three Quays document
29 th September 2015	Project update meeting with BCTQ	
6 th October 2015	Technical Specification document produced	Burness Corlett Three Quays document
3 rd November 2015	Project update meeting with BCTQ	
1 st December 2015	Project update meeting with BCTQ	
14 th January 2016	Mainstay Marine appointed as shipbuilders	
15 th March 2016	Meeting at Mainstay Marine	
21 st March 2016	Solent Growth Fund – Floating Bridge Project Funding Agreement	Signed by IWC 7 th April 2016
24 th May 2016	Meeting at Mainstay Marine	
6 th July 2016	Meeting at Mainstay Marine	
16 th August 2016	Meeting at Mainstay Marine	
14 th September 2016	Meeting at Mainstay Marine	
October 2016	Original expected date of delivery, but ongoing works on the slipways deferred delivery date to Spring 2017	
13 th October 2016	Meeting at Mainstay Marine	
24 th November 2016	Variation of contract letter to Owners representative TL	
2 nd January 2017	FB5 taken out of service	
March 2017	Project Manager left Mainstay	
8 th March 2017	Deadline for LOGASnet Q3 data	Required by Solent Local Enterprise Partnership
April 2017	Owners Representative ceases activity for IWC	
06 th April 2017	Floating Bridge leaves Pembroke Dock	

12 th April 2017	Staff training commences	
May 2017	Introduction of Floating Bridge into service accompanied by acceptance and commissioning activities	
3 rd May 2017	Vessel placed on chains	
03 rd of May 2017	Works to land based structures (footways, moving public realm items and new shelter) to be completed	
4 th May 2017	Commissioning , testing and trials activity commence	
5 th May 2017	Planned date for the Floating Bridge to enter service	
9 th May 2017	Slipway work completed	
13 May 2017	Floating Bridge goes into service	
13 th June 2017	Leader of the Council, Cllr Dave Stewart, commissions review into Floating Bridge	Undertaken by PWC
17 th July 2017	Floating Bridge enters the final commissioning phase	
18 th August 2017	Floating Bridge Update Meeting BTCQ	Teleconference
4 th September 2017	Floating Bridge taken out of Service.	Until such time as it can be demonstrated that the bridge, and the service it provides, can operate properly in accordance with the council's specified requirements.

Appendix 3 – PWC Report